Another 737 catches fire

[Provincial]

Just my opinion:

The Check Airman in the Blackhawk caused the collision (not an "accident") by several actions.

1) Reporting that he had traffic in sight, when he obviously didn't. I think he just said it to get ATC to let him continue the flight past the airport. He responded so quickly each time that he would not have time to look before he replied. Perhaps he saw the line of aircraft headed for Runway 1, and assumed that the CRJ was in that line, but that was negligent. He did this twice, and at least on the second instance the CRJ was pointing almost straight at him, not in the line with the other traffic, far enough above him that background lighting should not have been a factor, and had its landing lights on!

2) He was responsible, as check airman, to ensure that the pilot being checked was operating within the parameters of the approved flight path. He failed to do this. NTSB hasn't reported other dialogue from the CVR, and either he wasn't pointing out to her the deviations, or NTSB is trying to delay revealing it. Even if he was telling her to correct her errors, she didn't do it, and that lead to the collision. If she wasn't doing it, it was his responsibility to take over the controls to ensure safety of flight.

3) There seems to have been a difference between altitudes he reported to ATC and what was indicated on board the helicopter. Operating less than 500 feet above the ground/water and night, with major variations in altitude indications is reckless, even in visual conditions. This is even worse when night vision goggles are being used, which was the case here. The reported variation was half the maximum altitude (200 feet) allowed near the airport! In practice, they were operating without reliable altimeters, and the radar altimeter was not suitable for establishing a safe (and legal) altitude.

4) The check airman had been advised that the CRJ was doing a visual approach to Runway 33. This would cross the path of his flight, clearly about the same time he would be passing the final approach course. He chose to continue at the same speed, instead of slowing down to let the traffic cross ahead of him.

5) The check airman allowed the pilot to deviate to the right (west) of course, which should have taken the helicopter along the east bank of the river. The glideslope for Runway 33 would direct the CRJ to be over 400 feet high there, instead of a little over 300 feet near the point of impact. This is the difference between life and death.

6) The ATC transmission did not have a pause that would indicate it was complete before the direction to pass behind the CRJ. The check airman was so intent on brushing off ATC that he "stepped on" the last part of the controller's directions by pressing the mike button before the controller finished speaking. This is abnormal radio procedure. One always waits until the transmission has ended, usually for a couple of seconds, because sometimes ATC adds another comment. Everyone else on the frequency is expected to wait for the response to ATC before they transmit. The check airman obviously didn't want to hear from ATC, much less take action to address the controller's concerns. Remember, traffic alerts were going off at this time.

7) The pilot being checked was not highly experienced, and I believe was coming back from a non-flying assignment. She was getting back "up to speed" and flying a difficult course, at night, wearing NVG, in heavy traffic, in a helicopter with older instruments. Under the circumstances, it is not reasonable to expect perfection, and in fact the check airman is tasked to keep the pilot within safe parameters, and if necessary, take control of the aircraft. He failed to do that. I do not assign blame to the pilot being checked, as her responsibility was to do the best she could under the circumstances. So far, there is no evidence that she did anything less.

 

[VinnieBoomBah]

Just my opinion:

The Check Airman in the Blackhawk caused the collision (not an "accident") by several actions.

1) Reporting that he had traffic in sight, when he obviously didn't. I think he just said it to get ATC to let him continue the flight past the airport. He responded so quickly each time that he would not have time to look before he replied. Perhaps he saw the line of aircraft headed for Runway 1, and assumed that the CRJ was in that line, but that was negligent. He did this twice, and at least on the second instance the CRJ was pointing almost straight at him, not in the line with the other traffic, far enough above him that background lighting should not have been a factor, and had its landing lights on!

2) He was responsible, as check airman, to ensure that the pilot being checked was operating within the parameters of the approved flight path. He failed to do this. NTSB hasn't reported other dialogue from the CVR, and either he wasn't pointing out to her the deviations, or NTSB is trying to delay revealing it. Even if he was telling her to correct her errors, she didn't do it, and that lead to the collision. If she wasn't doing it, it was his responsibility to take over the controls to ensure safety of flight.

3) There seems to have been a difference between altitudes he reported to ATC and what was indicated on board the helicopter. Operating less than 500 feet above the ground/water and night, with major variations in altitude indications is reckless, even in visual conditions. This is even worse when night vision goggles are being used, which was the case here. The reported variation was half the maximum altitude (200 feet) allowed near the airport! In practice, they were operating without reliable altimeters, and the radar altimeter was not suitable for establishing a safe (and legal) altitude.

4) The check airman had been advised that the CRJ was doing a visual approach to Runway 33. This would cross the path of his flight, clearly about the same time he would be passing the final approach course. He chose to continue at the same speed, instead of slowing down to let the traffic cross ahead of him.

5) The check airman allowed the pilot to deviate to the right (west) of course, which should have taken the helicopter along the east bank of the river. The glideslope for Runway 33 would direct the CRJ to be over 400 feet high there, instead of a little over 300 feet near the point of impact. This is the difference between life and death.

6) The ATC transmission did not have a pause that would indicate it was complete before the direction to pass behind the CRJ. The check airman was so intent on brushing off ATC that he "stepped on" the last part of the controller's directions by pressing the mike button before the controller finished speaking. This is abnormal radio procedure. One always waits until the transmission has ended, usually for a couple of seconds, because sometimes ATC adds another comment. Everyone else on the frequency is expected to wait for the response to ATC before they transmit. The check airman obviously didn't want to hear from ATC, much less take action to address the controller's concerns. Remember, traffic alerts were going off at this time.

7) The pilot being checked was not highly experienced, and I believe was coming back from a non-flying assignment. She was getting back "up to speed" and flying a difficult course, at night, wearing NVG, in heavy traffic, in a helicopter with older instruments. Under the circumstances, it is not reasonable to expect perfection, and in fact the check airman is tasked to keep the pilot within safe parameters, and if necessary, take control of the aircraft. He failed to do that. I do not assign blame to the pilot being checked, as her responsibility was to do the best she could under the circumstances. So far, there is no evidence that she did anything less.

That is a whole boatload of carelessness behavior, or (if one was so inclined to such thoughts) less-than-caringness behavior

 

[ilikegunspdx]

Soem delta plane upside down somewhere now. How's that for specifics?

 

[WAW44]

Soem delta plane upside down somewhere now. How's that for specifics?

View attachment 2038942

Toronto

 

[P7M13]

https://www.wsj.com/business/airlines/delta-regional-jet-crashes-at-toronto-airport-13123298?st=Q9NWSu&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

 

[ilikegunspdx]

https://www.wsj.com/business/airlines/delta-regional-jet-crashes-at-toronto-airport-13123298?st=Q9NWSu&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

So lucky that didn't catch fire. I hope no one was hurt. It pays to assume the crash position:

 

[Ura-Ki]

Just my opinion:

The Check Airman in the Blackhawk caused the collision (not an "accident") by several actions.

1) Reporting that he had traffic in sight, when he obviously didn't. I think he just said it to get ATC to let him continue the flight past the airport. He responded so quickly each time that he would not have time to look before he replied. Perhaps he saw the line of aircraft headed for Runway 1, and assumed that the CRJ was in that line, but that was negligent. He did this twice, and at least on the second instance the CRJ was pointing almost straight at him, not in the line with the other traffic, far enough above him that background lighting should not have been a factor, and had its landing lights on!

2) He was responsible, as check airman, to ensure that the pilot being checked was operating within the parameters of the approved flight path. He failed to do this. NTSB hasn't reported other dialogue from the CVR, and either he wasn't pointing out to her the deviations, or NTSB is trying to delay revealing it. Even if he was telling her to correct her errors, she didn't do it, and that lead to the collision. If she wasn't doing it, it was his responsibility to take over the controls to ensure safety of flight.

3) There seems to have been a difference between altitudes he reported to ATC and what was indicated on board the helicopter. Operating less than 500 feet above the ground/water and night, with major variations in altitude indications is reckless, even in visual conditions. This is even worse when night vision goggles are being used, which was the case here. The reported variation was half the maximum altitude (200 feet) allowed near the airport! In practice, they were operating without reliable altimeters, and the radar altimeter was not suitable for establishing a safe (and legal) altitude.

4) The check airman had been advised that the CRJ was doing a visual approach to Runway 33. This would cross the path of his flight, clearly about the same time he would be passing the final approach course. He chose to continue at the same speed, instead of slowing down to let the traffic cross ahead of him.

5) The check airman allowed the pilot to deviate to the right (west) of course, which should have taken the helicopter along the east bank of the river. The glideslope for Runway 33 would direct the CRJ to be over 400 feet high there, instead of a little over 300 feet near the point of impact. This is the difference between life and death.

6) The ATC transmission did not have a pause that would indicate it was complete before the direction to pass behind the CRJ. The check airman was so intent on brushing off ATC that he "stepped on" the last part of the controller's directions by pressing the mike button before the controller finished speaking. This is abnormal radio procedure. One always waits until the transmission has ended, usually for a couple of seconds, because sometimes ATC adds another comment. Everyone else on the frequency is expected to wait for the response to ATC before they transmit. The check airman obviously didn't want to hear from ATC, much less take action to address the controller's concerns. Remember, traffic alerts were going off at this time.

7) The pilot being checked was not highly experienced, and I believe was coming back from a non-flying assignment. She was getting back "up to speed" and flying a difficult course, at night, wearing NVG, in heavy traffic, in a helicopter with older instruments. Under the circumstances, it is not reasonable to expect perfection, and in fact the check airman is tasked to keep the pilot within safe parameters, and if necessary, take control of the aircraft. He failed to do that. I do not assign blame to the pilot being checked, as her responsibility was to do the best she could under the circumstances. So far, there is no evidence that she did anything less.

SPOT ON!
My only addition here is the Route1/4 flight path of the Blackhawk, that is a hard set flight path right along the east bank of the river, NOT mid channel which closed the spacing that much more in the horizontal. As we all know, the Altitude was way off for the Helo, 125 feet higher then the hard celling plus or minus is YUGE. Another major issue is how the Instructor pilot allowed these variances beyond the hard set route requirements, especially given the specifics of that night's flight, I know these Blackhawks super well, there are TWO altimeters in front of EACH pilot ( One Static, One Radar), so there is no excuse for violating the hard celling, no flock of geese, no radio antenna, no other conflict at altitude, ZERO issues on that route!

I see a lot of blame being passed around, especially toward the CRJ crew, one thing to point out here ( Adding to your points above) that Crew are going through a pretty complex evolution to land, especially after having their landing runway changed last min. THIS is the Towers Phuck-up, as is often the case, controllers are stacking them wide and deep, and trying to expedite this and that to keep schedules and such, THIS put the CRJ in a really bad spot, forcing a turning type approach ( Instead of a long strait in approach to the normal Runway 1) from Initial to final, and down on in to short final, this turn took the Pilot in Command's eyes away from the windshield and relied entirely upon the Co-Pilot, who is now compromised due to the left turn to final, so the Helo is now well below his line of sight at that critical stage, they had ZERO chance to avoid traffic, and with the split coms in the tower, likely didn't even know the danger just off their nose!

Lots of routine failures that compounded over years is what lead to this, a series of close calls that over time became so common that they were simply ignored, and allowed to remain as routine, THIS lies at the feet of the Tower Controller ( NOT the Pilots), his boss, and his boss's boss, and ultimately the FAA it's self for allowing these very risky flight ops to continue unenforced!

All the holes in the swiss cheese lined upp this one time, and now, after killing a bunch of people, finally much needed changes will result here, its just a shame it had to happen like this, especially after such a culture of complacency was allowed to exist here!


THIS is far from the only VERY HIGH risk area, we have seen hundreds of close calls this year alone, and were only second month in, the FAA needs to really step up, need's a massive investigation of it's operating authority ( An not it's own self serving internal investigations and compliance division) their operations need to be seriously scrutinized, and changes in those operations made NOW, no excuses, no more bureaucratic two step, pass the buck, we'll handle it on our own, investigate ourselves like they always do, NO, not this time, not any more, not ever again!

 

[ilikegunspdx]

SPOT ON!
My only addition here is the Route1/4 flight path of the Blackhawk, that is a hard set flight path right along the east bank of the river, NOT mid channel which closed the spacing that much more in the horizontal. As we all know, the Altitude was way off for the Helo, 125 feet higher then the hard celling plus or minus is YUGE. Another major issue is how the Instructor pilot allowed these variances beyond the hard set route requirements, especially given the specifics of that night's flight, I know these Blackhawks super well, there are TWO altimeters in front of EACH pilot ( One Static, One Radar), so there is no excuse for violating the hard celling, no flock of geese, no radio antenna, no other conflict at altitude, ZERO issues on that route!

I see a lot of blame being passed around, especially toward the CRJ crew, one thing to point out here ( Adding to your points above) that Crew are going through a pretty complex evolution to land, especially after having their landing runway changed last min. THIS is the Towers Phuck-up, as is often the case, controllers are stacking them wide and deep, and trying to expedite this and that to keep schedules and such, THIS put the CRJ in a really bad spot, forcing a turning type approach ( Instead of a long strait in approach to the normal Runway 1) from Initial to final, and down on in to short final, this turn took the Pilot in Command's eyes away from the windshield and relied entirely upon the Co-Pilot, who is now compromised due to the left turn to final, so the Helo is now well below his line of sight at that critical stage, they had ZERO chance to avoid traffic, and with the split coms in the tower, likely didn't even know the danger just off their nose!

Lots of routine failures that compounded over years is what lead to this, a series of close calls that over time became so common that they were simply ignored, and allowed to remain as routine, THIS lies at the feet of the Tower Controller ( NOT the Pilots), his boss, and his boss's boss, and ultimately the FAA it's self for allowing these very risky flight ops to continue unenforced!

All the holes in the swiss cheese lined upp this one time, and now, after killing a bunch of people, finally much needed changes will result here, its just a shame it had to happen like this, especially after such a culture of complacency was allowed to exist here!


THIS is far from the only VERY HIGH risk area, we have seen hundreds of close calls this year alone, and were only second month in, the FAA needs to really step up, need's a massive investigation of it's operating authority ( An not it's own self serving internal investigations and compliance division) their operations need to be seriously scrutinized, and changes in those operations made NOW, no excuses, no more bureaucratic two step, pass the buck, we'll handle it on our own, investigate ourselves like they always do, NO, not this time, not any more, not ever again!

I don't understand how flight radios work but seems to me there could be a mandated update to go digital radio that would allow to hear all aircraft close by? Maybe costs too much though. I have no clue just wondering.

 

[Loc]

I don't understand how flight radios work but seems to me there could be a mandated update to go digital radio that would allow to hear all aircraft close by? Maybe costs too much though. I have no clue just wondering.

Going digital has been avoided to accommodate ALL aircraft types, including the far more common civilian small planes still flying around using analog radios. The costs to private pilot owners to upgrade to digital in their Cessna 150 or 172 is prohibitive along with all the other ownership costs - maintenance, fuel, plane storage/tie-downs, insurance, etc.

 

[Ura-Ki]

View: https://youtu.be/v8sNVcm9TMU?si=n9khqwcfPo12zhWf

 

[Provincial]

Ura-Ki, has the NTSB informed us of who was the Pilot Flying the CRJ in the DCA crash? I see comments assuming that the Captain was the Pilot Flying, many very soon after the crash. If the Copilot was the Pilot Flying, the Captain would have been the one tasked with visual avoidance, and would have been in a very poor position to see the helicopter coming.

When I listen to the radio transmissions, I do not hear the normal noise that comes when two transmissions overlap. From this I wonder if the Blackhawk radio has a lag between when the mike is keyed and the transmission starts. This might lead a Blackhawk pilot to get in the habit of keying the mike a second or two prior to speaking, and would explain why he was cutting off the ATC transmissions. Such a lag would also explain why he was unaware that he had missed part of the ATC transmission. Another black mark on his record.

The very rapid response to ATC of "Traffic in sight" indicates to me that he had learned that those were magic words to get ATC off his back.

I feel strongly that even with visual separation, once an aircraft is on the final approach course, no traffic should be within 1/2 mile of the approach course, unless crossing above with a vertical clearance of at least 1,000 feet. Even those distances are too small, but a compromise to expedite traffic. The final approach course should be "sanitized" so the crew can focus on the safe landing, not traffic.

 

[ilikegunspdx]

Video of the Toronto crash. ATC said 35 mph gusts. Looks to me like right wing broke off right away. It looks to me like he was too short and hit a road before the runway.

View: https://youtu.be/ZLKbrL7KFNY?si=qRzGnTr_mnp-3uK7

 

[Provincial]

Hard landing.

 

[ilikegunspdx]

I tried to sharpen and enhance it. Looks well short to me fwiw. Flopped right onto the road looks like.

ScreenRecording_02-17-2025 19-48-55_1.mov

• ilikegunspdx
• Feb 17, 2025

 

[Ura-Ki]

Video of the Toronto crash. ATC said 35 mph gusts. Looks to me like right wing broke off right away. It looks to me like he was too short and hit a road before the runway.

View: https://youtu.be/ZLKbrL7KFNY?si=qRzGnTr_mnp-3uK7

Wind Shear most likely, with those sorts of gusts on short final, and the approach nearly stalled, I'm gonna say unstabilized approach, ( too far behind the curve) in strong wind gusts, hits wind shear and drops it in like a Bush Pilot, which brakes it into pieces! Lucky they were as slow as they were, that could have ended much worse then it did! Still, don't think that's gonna buff out!

 

[Provincial]

It looks like everybody fastened their seat belts and the tanks got opened up enough to leave most of the fuel behind from their forward progress. Very fortunate for the occupants.

Maybe an idea for a new carnival ride?

 

[Ura-Ki]

Ura-Ki, has the NTSB informed us of who was the Pilot Flying the CRJ in the DCA crash? I see comments assuming that the Captain was the Pilot Flying, many very soon after the crash. If the Copilot was the Pilot Flying, the Captain would have been the one tasked with visual avoidance, and would have been in a very poor position to see the helicopter coming.

When I listen to the radio transmissions, I do not hear the normal noise that comes when two transmissions overlap. From this I wonder if the Blackhawk radio has a lag between when the mike is keyed and the transmission starts. This might lead a Blackhawk pilot to get in the habit of keying the mike a second or two prior to speaking, and would explain why he was cutting off the ATC transmissions. Such a lag would also explain why he was unaware that he had missed part of the ATC transmission. Another black mark on his record.

The very rapid response to ATC of "Traffic in sight" indicates to me that he had learned that those were magic words to get ATC off his back.

I feel strongly that even with visual separation, once an aircraft is on the final approach course, no traffic should be within 1/2 mile of the approach course, unless crossing above with a vertical clearance of at least 1,000 feet. Even those distances are too small, but a compromise to expedite traffic. The final approach course should be "sanitized" so the crew can focus on the safe landing, not traffic.

I have not seen/heard who was actually hand flying the plane. It's common enough to have the Co-Pilot shoot the landings that it could have been either one! Would still be helpful to know, if it was the Left Seat (Captain for the non pilots here) then yea, his job is to make the instrument approach even on VFR ( Head down in the cockpit) and have the Right Seat ( Co-Pilot) do the visual and back the pilot on the gauges with things like confirming flaps, airspeed, glide slope, and altitude calls, and any radio work as needed so that the guy flying the plane can do it safely! If they are flying as a standard crew, Pilot in command actually hand flying the plane ( No Auto Land), and the Co- Pilot doing his job backing the pilot visually, then this was BAD, even worse if they switched off, with the Co_Pilot at the controls, now NOBODY on the flight deck could have seen anything below the nose and off to the right side, especially if the plane is still completing it's left hand turn to final, putting the Co-Pilot above line of sight to the approaching helo, and the Pilot ecluded by the entire nose and forward structure if he was even looking out the windows! This is why I believe ALL commercial aircraft should be equipped with a Heads Up Display, get BOTH crew's Eyes up and out of the damn cockpit, Aviate, Navigate, Communicate!

I have seen a number of videos on the radio transmissions , all show the same thing, all the same radio calls, and while the ONLY things that really stick out in my mind are 1) The initial Tower request on approach for the CRJ to change coarse to Runway 33 from Runway 1, that was my first red flag, you DON'T make a switch like that on an approach unless there is a serious need, not just controller convenience, big no-no here. 2) Was the Helo asking for and getting confirmation of Visual Separation ( Which is the Helo taking responsibility for maintaining visual contact, ( and the BIG QUESTION HERE, Which airplane on the approach was he actually seeing ) and my MAJOR issue here, the tower passing off direct control of his airspace to an outside source when he knows he has a conflict within the outer limits of caution! 3) The tower asking again for the Helo to confirm he DID have visual on the CRJ when it was fast on collision course, as the controller on the scope had already ignored at least three conflict warnings on his scope, and here his boss ( for reasons yet to be known), the tower chief should have taken control and called ALL AIRCRAFT PULL UP, HARD LEFT TURN, GO AROUND,, NOW!!!! THIS was mistake number three in the tower and completely unacceptable!

As to the Helo's Radio work, I would say that it was or had become standard practice there, those radios are new enough to not have any delay, so unless he is on VOX, I.E. voice activated, which I don't even know why that is even still available/allowed, his delay and keying the mike and blocking the tower and ignoring any further instructions is both obtuse and arrogant, BOTH unacceptable for any aviator , Military, Professional, or Private!

FYI, the NTSB has filed well over a thousand official recommendations to the FAA on this particular flight operation, and its serious hazards, the the FAA has flat ignored them ALL! Basically telling the NTSB that they would handle it, and then do absolutely NOTHING about any of it! THIS needs to get all the senior management of the FAA FIRED and investigated for serious violations of its duties!

 

[gmerkt]

the FAA needs to really step up, need's a massive investigation of it's operating authority ( An not it's own self serving internal investigations and compliance division) their operations need to be seriously scrutinized, and changes in those operations made NOW, no excuses, no more bureaucratic two step, pass the buck, we'll handle it on our own, investigate ourselves like they always do, NO, not this time, not any more, not ever again!

This doesn't seem likely to happen now that the Trump Admin. is bent on slimming down the government.

 

[Ura-Ki]

This doesn't seem likely to happen now that the Trump Admin. is bent on slimming down the government.

Actualy, there is a Metric Sh!t ton of pending litigation against the FAA and it's rules and a bunch of other crap they have been getting away with, I'm betting Trump is going to GUT them to the Bone, and crack skulls on those left over! Don't get me wrong here, I have ZERO issues with the local inspectors and am actually friends with many, these are the hard working unsung heros in all this with their hands tied behind their backs, NO! The FAA needs to be reigned in and forced into compliance, and stripped of a lot of their powers, they are a lot like the ATF in this, and it really needs to stop!

 

[Provincial]

The FAA has handed the Trump Administration an ax and put it's head on the chopping block. Long overdue.

When ATC was moved from the military to civilian status after WWII, it was filled with the military staff. They just changed clothes and operated the same. The biggest source of new controllers (and managers) was the military, and that mindset was so well entrenched that it was impossible for political appointees to change anything.

I haven't kept up, but 30 years ago the military mindset was still locked into ATC. It appears that nothing has changed.

The DC helicopter routes are there so elites can avoid ground transportation and delays. The FAA would never address the safety issues since they were desired by important people. It is sad that so many civilians died, instead of a pompous General, but the safety of air travel needs to be more important than convenience of a small group of elites.

The helicopter routes don't need to be eliminated, but they have to yield airspace to commercial flights. They can pass when the airspace is clear, but have to hold in known safe areas until that traffic is safely out of the way. This should have been the rule long ago. I suspect that ATC had orders not to delay these helicopters because of the powerful people they carried. I doubt a more "conventional" Administration would have the fortitude to make the necessary changes, but this one probably will.