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Over 20 years later, they can actually talk about it now.
In March 1991, just before the Gulf War's formal cease fire took effect, Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner tasked a RED HORSE/EOD team to deny Tallil and Jalibah air bases in southeastern Iraq for use by returning Iraqi forces. At Tallil, they used almost 80,000 lbs of explosives to make cuts in the runway and taxiway every 2,000 feet. At Jalibah Air Base, the engineers denied a concrete runway and two parallel asphalt taxiways, with 27 cuts (72 craters up to 40 feet wide and 12 feet deep) in the pavement. Twelve years later, U.S. forces returned to both locations and Air Force civil engineers were living and working at Tallil (Ali Air Base).
In March 1991, just before the Gulf War's formal cease fire took effect, Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner tasked a RED HORSE/EOD team to deny Tallil and Jalibah air bases in southeastern Iraq for use by returning Iraqi forces. At Tallil, they used almost 80,000 lbs of explosives to make cuts in the runway and taxiway every 2,000 feet. At Jalibah Air Base, the engineers denied a concrete runway and two parallel asphalt taxiways, with 27 cuts (72 craters up to 40 feet wide and 12 feet deep) in the pavement. Twelve years later, U.S. forces returned to both locations and Air Force civil engineers were living and working at Tallil (Ali Air Base).
