For those who don't view "locking oneself away in a fortress" as a viable tactic for most possible SHTF scenarios I recently read SLA Marshall's The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation and thought it had some decent SHTF ideas. For instance, Marshall focuses on the 1/3 body weight rule of thumb for the entire weight of clothing, weapon and gear for mobile infantry troops. In general he recommends that this total be kept below 40 Lbs. He recommends stripping down non-essentials and even keeping on person food supplies to a minimum. Using the Red Army and Stonewall Jackson's example of what to do about food: "... This came from another witness, General Hasso Eccard Manteuffel, who later commanded the Fifth Panzer Army on the Western Front. "Their advance is unlike anything ever seen in operations between western armies. The Soldier carries a sack on his back with dry crusts and raw vegetables collected on the march. The horses forage where they can. You can't stop them like an ordinary army by cutting their communications, for you rarely find any supply columns to strike." Maybe that is somewhat of an exaggeration. No doubt the Russian mode of warfare ate on Manteuffel's nerves, just as it did on those of every other orthodox Soldier who faced the Red Army for very long. But there is no doubt whatever that operating on a minimum subsistence level is one of the prime factors in Soviet military strength. As in Stonewall Jackson's corps, cooking equipment is of the simplest sort. One large kettle will take care of the needs of 150 men-thick soup for breakfast and a heavy meat stew for supper with rice and barley. The ration of two pounds of black bread per day which the Soldier carries on his back is cooked right at the front in portable ovens. Wherever troops move, they forage, and rations are reduced according to foraging possibilities. As witness, we have this revealing statement by M. F. Kerner, who served as Quartermaster General of the Czech Corps in the Red Army: "When the Corps was advancing in August, 1944, there was allocated to it as its September ration some hundreds of acres of standing wheat. This wheat had to be harvested and milled by the local population." As startling as are these World War II flashbacks of an Army operating as an armed horde, a far more arresting piece of information comes from yet another witness. Brig. Gen. James C. Crockett was United States attache' for intelligence in Moscow for four years, beginning in 1944. He returned to this country in 1948. Said Crockett: "The doctrine of the new Russian Army is to get weight off the back of the combat Soldier and put it on transport-any kind of transport that will carry it, even a donkey cart.This is a main change in operational theory since 1945. The pack-the total weight of it, including all clothing but the great sheep-lined coat-has been reduced to 40 pounds. When I left Moscow all field exercises were being conducted under this weight. It appears to be the Russian intention to aim at this same maximum for combat." Though the horde army seems to have learned the hard way, at least it learned." Thoughts?