JavaScript is disabled
Our website requires JavaScript to function properly. For a better experience, please enable JavaScript in your browser settings before proceeding.
Messages
2,186
Reactions
4,958
Found this video interview with a couple people who've spent the past 2 years fighting in Ukraine. Some interesting takeaways about how modern combat is evolving, particularly around using technology. People's feelings about the politics of the Ukraine situation and/or gun-tubers/social media personalities notwithstanding, I found it informative and think it's worth watching.

Highlights:
- Both guys interviewed had added foam padding to their NVG pouches because existing pouches don't protect the units enough, and breakage is apparently very common.
- They added shammy/microfiber cloths to their kit for keeping their optics clean.
- Emphasized the importance of reducing reflective signature - covering lenses and shiny stuff to avoid advertising presence to hostiles with NVGs.
- Heavy drone usage, picked up a lot in the last year. Main uses include area surveillance, guiding artillery, and direct engagement (dropping bombs, attacking individual soldiers, etc).
- Teams are now being deployed with shotguns w/ birdshot so they can shoot down drones.
- Sometimes they can't tell if a drone is friendly or hostile due to confused battlefield situation.
- Trench warfare is making a comeback, with some changes to counter the drone threat (mainly overhead cover).
- Will sometimes cover openings with blankets to keep drones out of enclosed areas, as they can be used to target humans directly.
- Usage of computers to identify reflections from red dots / optics and issue targeting instructions to snipers or artillery (recommended using a flash kill device on optics to prevent it being picked up).
- Apparently the Russians send conscript soldiers out to beat bushes and identify where the enemy is (cannon fodder), at which point the enemy position will be targeted by more experienced / capable units at a distance.

View: https://youtu.be/Tge7YMi4gJs?feature=shared
 
Oh man. This doesn't even scratch the surface.

- Long story short, massing combat power is a thing of the past where drone mitigation is degraded or non-existent. That's something we are learning in the Army, Ranger school style patrol bases are gigantic targets in a peer fight. I mean, we should have known this, patrol bases got overrun a lot in Korea and Nam, in the modern era where EW and drones are often seen at the squad and team level, they are even less survivable.

- Furthermore, the idea that you can achieve any sort of tactical surprise near the FEBA is a bit silly at this point, because of the battlefield being saturated with surveillance drones and jamming. This will likely lead to small unit leaders seeing increased responsibility to conduct their own movement and coordination with adjacent units (even squads in their own platoons) in order to spread their unit out to increase survivability.

- Comms are continuing to be degraded, the notion that radio communications and the vast suits of comm gear related to SA will result in enhanced combat capabilities is becoming a thing of the past. Truly, we may be looking at wide scale turns back to analogue solutions.

- Trenches have been back for the last 10 years in the Donbas, so enter and clear trench is still a vital battle drill. However, take into account modern surveillance and defensive capabilities in regard to planning assaults because if you try to approach the problem with only a horizontal focus you'll never gain a foothold.

- Decentralized operations will enable casualty ridden units and those in comms denied areas to be more effective in regards to achieving commanders intent. This is a no brainer but the last 20 years of GWOT has led to small unit leaders in the conventional forces being less capable of adaptive and creative decision making.

These are just a few observations that myself and other NCOs and Officers have made over the last few years. There is some stuff I have learned from Ukrainians themselves that are really bubbleguming wild, but I have yet to determine how those lessons are applied to a military that operates as ours does with the capabilities we have. BLUF on this, not every lesson the Ukrainians have learned is applicable to us.

The last point you make about the use of conscripts needs to be sussed out a little. It's not that they are just sending conscripts, its often troops recruited from prisons much the same way Wagner did to support their operations against Bakhmut in late 22 - early 23. Right now, the vast majority of Russian troops are conscripts, not professional soldiers with pre-war training and wartime experience. The Russians are therefore forced to employ these troops in often suicidal attacks, much like we saw at Avdiivka, where they lost by conservative estimates two divisions in equipment and likely 16-20k worth of dead on the low end. These operations are not sustainable long term if they want to maintain a conventional force. Therefore, they employ SOF and more elite units once particular Ukrainian positions are worn down. I don't think the Russians are thinking far beyond their current predicament in Ukraine, because if NATO decided (it won't, but let's contemplate the idea) to assault say Kaliningrad, the Russians would not have sizeable conventional forces to prevent that Oblasts capture.

For background before some moron says "tHaTs UkRaNiAn PrOpAgAnDa, RuSsIa StRoNk!!!!", there is a TON of analytical work by professionals both in the military and civilian sectors, here in the states and across the pond, supporting what I have written above. Michael Kofman, Jack Watling and Rob Lee to name a few. My job gives me a solid base in this sort of thing, so if you have any questions I will do my best to answer them, or i can reach out to Americans and Ukrainians I know currently fighting in Ukraine.
 
Of course combat is evolving..should come as no surprise.

However some things to consider here are...

Make sure you evolve with it...Be adaptable to the situation that you are in.
Combat doesn't care one whit for your plans , training , equipment and the like.
To be blunt...War is a ravenous whore , who doesn't care who it devours up....and sh!ts out.

Also don't be too quick to dismiss tech and firearms from the past...
While maybe not so "modern" any longer....I have seen plenty of people wounded or killed by use of WWII and Cold War era small arms...as well as artillery and mortars.

Lessons from the past can still be relevant ...
Many things related to combat and warfare , have not changed since the bronze age.
Andy
 
EMCON training is being pushed down to the lowest levels

In Ukraine personal electronic devices are not allowed within 50km of the front lines

at our training centers, drone swarms, EMCON and C-sUAS are being used and exploited against training units

Russians using ORLAN 10s with LEER-3 packages are exploiting the battlefield and other areas

its the new modern battlefield everyone is trying to adapt too, unfortunately
 
Oh man. This doesn't even scratch the surface.

- Long story short, massing combat power is a thing of the past where drone mitigation is degraded or non-existent. That's something we are learning in the Army, Ranger school style patrol bases are gigantic targets in a peer fight. I mean, we should have known this, patrol bases got overrun a lot in Korea and Nam, in the modern era where EW and drones are often seen at the squad and team level, they are even less survivable.

- Furthermore, the idea that you can achieve any sort of tactical surprise near the FEBA is a bit silly at this point, because of the battlefield being saturated with surveillance drones and jamming. This will likely lead to small unit leaders seeing increased responsibility to conduct their own movement and coordination with adjacent units (even squads in their own platoons) in order to spread their unit out to increase survivability.

- Comms are continuing to be degraded, the notion that radio communications and the vast suits of comm gear related to SA will result in enhanced combat capabilities is becoming a thing of the past. Truly, we may be looking at wide scale turns back to analogue solutions.

- Trenches have been back for the last 10 years in the Donbas, so enter and clear trench is still a vital battle drill. However, take into account modern surveillance and defensive capabilities in regard to planning assaults because if you try to approach the problem with only a horizontal focus you'll never gain a foothold.

- Decentralized operations will enable casualty ridden units and those in comms denied areas to be more effective in regards to achieving commanders intent. This is a no brainer but the last 20 years of GWOT has led to small unit leaders in the conventional forces being less capable of adaptive and creative decision making.

These are just a few observations that myself and other NCOs and Officers have made over the last few years. There is some stuff I have learned from Ukrainians themselves that are really bubbleguming wild, but I have yet to determine how those lessons are applied to a military that operates as ours does with the capabilities we have. BLUF on this, not every lesson the Ukrainians have learned is applicable to us.

The last point you make about the use of conscripts needs to be sussed out a little. It's not that they are just sending conscripts, its often troops recruited from prisons much the same way Wagner did to support their operations against Bakhmut in late 22 - early 23. Right now, the vast majority of Russian troops are conscripts, not professional soldiers with pre-war training and wartime experience. The Russians are therefore forced to employ these troops in often suicidal attacks, much like we saw at Avdiivka, where they lost by conservative estimates two divisions in equipment and likely 16-20k worth of dead on the low end. These operations are not sustainable long term if they want to maintain a conventional force. Therefore, they employ SOF and more elite units once particular Ukrainian positions are worn down. I don't think the Russians are thinking far beyond their current predicament in Ukraine, because if NATO decided (it won't, but let's contemplate the idea) to assault say Kaliningrad, the Russians would not have sizeable conventional forces to prevent that Oblasts capture.

For background before some moron says "tHaTs UkRaNiAn PrOpAgAnDa, RuSsIa StRoNk!!!!", there is a TON of analytical work by professionals both in the military and civilian sectors, here in the states and across the pond, supporting what I have written above. Michael Kofman, Jack Watling and Rob Lee to name a few. My job gives me a solid base in this sort of thing, so if you have any questions I will do my best to answer them, or i can reach out to Americans and Ukrainians I know currently fighting in Ukraine.
That's a pretty good review.
 
Thanks for sharing that. I'm curious about their use of shotguns for drones. He's saying they use birdshot. What sort of range would #7 1/2 shot be effective at with non-choke Mossberg 500/590 w/ 20" you think. 20-30yrds?
 
Did you not watch the vidya!?
Pm8SWpY.jpeg.jpg
 
Thanks for sharing that. I'm curious about their use of shotguns for drones. He's saying they use birdshot. What sort of range would #7 1/2 shot be effective at with non-choke Mossberg 500/590 w/ 20" you think. 20-30yrds?
Gonna be real with you here, homie.

You don't want HE airbursting at 20-30 yards from you. Sure its better than a point impact a few feet away, but you'd want something with some range. and that's if you can hit a racing drone going at near or above 100MPH. Shot guns are more effective against drone dropping munitions versus FPV.
 
In Ukraine personal electronic devices are not allowed within 50km of the front lines
Highly dependent on location. In some areas, cell phones are primary versus radio systems because it is enabling units to hide in the static. However, in non-urban areas, if you broadcast from anything you are a dingus and likely about to to get smacked with 152mm. Anyways, that point is highly contextual. It's fascinating to see the changes happening at the CTCs.
 
Alright I love this topic so I am going to try to put it back on track.

In terms of the pace of innovation in this conflict, we have seen several emerging technologies become far more prominent.

First is the advent of unmanned maritime vehicles. Now when these first started being used I was hesitant to buy into the notion that they would be transformative to naval warfare. Now, 18 months later, with 1/3 of the Black Sea Fleet sunk or requiring major repairs, I am sold on the utility. The Ukrainians, without a large traditional Navy, are making the Black Sea a unsecured area for the Russians where before it was simply a Russian pond.

Second, is the density of Russian of information operations. Early on in the war, Russian information operations were surgical yet remarkably ineffective. Obviously fraudulant videos of "polish" special operations conducting daytime raids in Poland and claims of chemical warfare facility in the Donbas fell on mostly deaf ears. The Russians have done a better job in recent months of throwing bubblegum at the wall and hoping it sticks, resulting in effective messaging in Western Europe and the U.S.. The truth of that messaging is obviously in question at all times, given that the narratives being pushed are so blatantly false, but in some communities they still find success.

Third and final observation. The Special Operations field has been WILD. The Ukrainians and Russians both are going ham in their enemy rear areas, with Russia likely behind multiple hacks, fires, and suspicious events even in the U.S.. The books that will be written when it's all over will be must read.
 
Alright I love this topic so I am going to try to put it back on track.

In terms of the pace of innovation in this conflict, we have seen several emerging technologies become far more prominent.

First is the advent of unmanned maritime vehicles. Now when these first started being used I was hesitant to buy into the notion that they would be transformative to naval warfare. Now, 18 months later, with 1/3 of the Black Sea Fleet sunk or requiring major repairs, I am sold on the utility. The Ukrainians, without a large traditional Navy, are making the Black Sea a unsecured area for the Russians where before it was simply a Russian pond.

Second, is the density of Russian of information operations. Early on in the war, Russian information operations were surgical yet remarkably ineffective. Obviously fraudulant videos of "polish" special operations conducting daytime raids in Poland and claims of chemical warfare facility in the Donbas fell on mostly deaf ears. The Russians have done a better job in recent months of throwing bubblegum at the wall and hoping it sticks, resulting in effective messaging in Western Europe and the U.S.. The truth of that messaging is obviously in question at all times, given that the narratives being pushed are so blatantly false, but in some communities they still find success.

Third and final observation. The Special Operations field has been WILD. The Ukrainians and Russians both are going ham in their enemy rear areas, with Russia likely behind multiple hacks, fires, and suspicious events even in the U.S.. The books that will be written when it's all over will be must read.
Those drone boats, "sea babies" are 3-D printed using US donated printers and carry a half ton warhead iirc.
 

Upcoming Events

Centralia Gun Show
Centralia, WA
Klamath Falls gun show
Klamath Falls, OR
Oregon Arms Collectors April 2024 Gun Show
Portland, OR
Albany Gun Show
Albany, OR

New Resource Reviews

New Classified Ads

Back Top